On the Measurment of Job Risk in Hedonic Wage Models by Black, Dan & Kniesner, Thomas J
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Center for Policy Research Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
1-2003 
On the Measurment of Job Risk in Hedonic Wage Models 
Dan Black 
Syracuse University 
Thomas J. Kniesner 
Syracuse University, TKniesne@Maxwell.Syr.Edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/cpr 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Black, Dan and Kniesner, Thomas J., "On the Measurment of Job Risk in Hedonic Wage Models" (2003). 
Center for Policy Research. 181. 
https://surface.syr.edu/cpr/181 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
Affairs at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Policy Research by an authorized administrator of 
SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
 ISSN: 1525-3066 
 
 
 
 
Center for Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 49 
 
 
ON THE MEASUREMENT OF JOB RISK  
IN HEDONIC WAGE MODELS* 
 
 
Dan A. Black and Thomas J. Kniesner 
 
 
 
 
Center for Policy Research 
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
Syracuse University 
426 Eggers Hall 
Syracuse, New York 13244-1020 
(315) 443-3114 | Fax (315) 443-1081 
e-mail: ctrpol@syr.edu 
 
 
 
 
January 2003 
[Revised March 2003] 
 
 
$5.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Up-to-date information about CPR’s research projects and other activities is 
available from our World Wide Web site at www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu. All 
recent working papers and Policy Briefs can be read and/or printed from there as 
well.
 CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH – Spring 2003 
 
Timothy Smeeding, Director 
Professor of Economics & Public Administration 
__________ 
 
Associate Directors 
 
Margaret Austin Douglas Holtz-Eakin 
Associate Director, Professor of Economics 
Budget and Administration Associate Director, Center for Policy Research 
  
Douglas Wolf John Yinger 
Professor of Public Administration Professor of Economics and Public Administration 
Associate Director, Aging Studies Program Associate Director, Metropolitan Studies Program 
 
SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATES 
 
Scott Allard............................. Public Administration 
Dan Black............................................... Economics 
Arthur Brooks ........................ Public Administration 
Stacy Dickert-Conlin............................... Economics 
William Duncombe ................. Public Administration 
Gary Engelhardt ................... ................. Economics 
Deborah Freund................... . Public Administration 
Vernon Greene .................... . Public Administration 
Madonna Harrington Meyer .....................Sociology 
Christine Himes........................................Sociology 
William C. Horrace .................................Economics 
Bernard Jump ........................Public Administration 
Duke Kao ...............................................Economics 
Eric Kingson......................... ............... Social Work 
Thomas Kniesner ................. .................Economics 
Jeff Kubik............................................... Economics 
Andrew London ....................................... Sociology  
Jerry Miner .............................................Economics 
John Moran .......................... .................Economics 
Jan Ondrich ........................................... Economics 
John Palmer ...........................Public Administration 
Lori Ploutz-Snyder .. Health and Physical Education 
Jeff Racine ............................................ Economics 
Grant Reeher.................................Political Science 
Stuart Rosenthal................... .................Economics 
Michael Wasylenko................................ Economics 
Janet Wilmoth.......................................... Sociology 
 
 
GRADUATE ASSOCIATES 
 
Anna Amirkhanyan.................Public Administration 
Beth Ashby.............................................Economics 
Eldar Beiseitov ......................................Economics 
Caroline Bourdeaux ...............Public Administration 
Christine Caffrey ......................................Sociology 
Gabby Chapman....................................Economics 
Yong Chen .............................................Economics 
Seng Eun Choi ......................................Economics 
Carrie Cochran.......................Public Administration 
Christopher Cunningham .......................Economics 
Sarah Douglas .......................Public Administration 
Tae Ho Eom...........................Public Administration 
Ying Fang ................................................Sociology 
Amy Fedigan..........................Public Administration 
Jose Galdo.............................................Economics 
Andrzej Grodner.....................................Economics 
Glenda Gross...........................................Sociology 
 
Jerry Kalarickal ..................................... Economics 
Anil Kumar............................................. Economics 
Kristina Lambright ................. Public Administration 
Xiaoli Liang............................................ Economics 
Liqun Liu ............................................... Economics 
Alison Louie........................... Public Administration 
Joseph Marchand.................................. Economics 
Cristian Meghea ................................... Economics 
Emily Pas ............................................. Economics 
Adriana Sandu....................... Public Administration 
Jon Schwabish .....................................Economics 
Claudia Smith ........................................Economics 
Sara Smits ..............................................Sociology 
Lora Walters .........................Public Administration 
Wen Wang.............................Public Administration 
James Williamson..................................Economics  
Bo Zhao.................................................Economics 
 
 
STAFF
 
Kelly Bogart ....................... Administrative Secretary 
Martha Bonney....... Publications/Events Coordinator 
Karen Cimilluca............. Librarian/Office Coordinator 
Kim Desmond ................... Administrative Secretary 
Kati Foley .....................Administrative Assistant, LIS 
Emily NaPier ..............Senior Secretary/Receptionist 
Kitty Nasto.......................... Administrative Secretary 
Candi Patterson.......................Computer Consultant 
Denise Paul ..........................Editorial Assistant, NTJ 
Mary Santy .........................Administrative Secretary 
Mindy Tanner .....................Administrative Secretary
  
Abstract 
 We examine the incidence, form, and research consequences of measurement 
error in measure of fatal injury risk in United States workplaces using both BLS and 
NIOSH data. We find evidence of substantial measurement errors in the fatality risk 
researchers attach to individual workers when estimating the implicit price of risk and the 
value of a statistical life. We first examine possible classical attenuation bias in the 
fatality risk coefficient. However, because we also find non-classical measurement error 
that differs across multiple risk measures and is not independent of other regressors, more 
complex statistical procedures than a standard instrumental variables estimator need be 
applied to obtain statistically improved estimates of wage-fatality risk tradeoffs. We 
conclude by noting that the National Institute of Safety and Health’s industry risk 
measure produces implicit value of life estimates much more in line with the mode for 
the existing literature than other risk measures.  
  
Introduction 
 At least since Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, economists have acknowledged that 
workers require compensation to accept the risk of fatal or non-fatal injuries at work. A 
compensating wage premium provides employers with incentives to reduce the risk on the job, 
and the calculus of the marketplace allows workers and employers to trade the costs of reducing 
workplace risk against the benefits associated with the risk reduction. When large numbers of 
workers reveal wage-risk tradeoffs, a researcher can calculate the implied value of a statistical 
life, or the wage reduction associated with reducing the expected number of deaths by one 
worker. Because the value represents the amount of total wages that workers are willing to forgo 
to reduce risk, the value of a statistical life appears to be a useful tool for evaluating individuals’ 
willingness to pay for reductions in risk in other situations and provides policymakers with 
valuable information for the benefit side of programs to improve health and safety (Office of 
Management and Budget 2003). We examine here the amount of heterogeneity in estimated 
compensating wage differentials for fatal injury risk in the United States across alternative risk 
measures, whether wage differential differences across risk measures can be reconciled 
statistically, and discuss the policy and future research consequences of differences in 
compensating wage differentials across risk measures. 
 When basing policy on estimates of the price of risk, the precision and accuracy of the 
estimates can be important. Yet, Viscusi (1993) and Viscusi and Aldy (2002), in reviewing labor 
market studies of the value of life, report that the majority of the estimates are in the $4 to $9.5 
million range (excluding the studies that Viscusi felt were flawed). Although there is over a 133 
percent variation in the point estimates from the most well done studies, Viscusi correctly notes 
that much variation should be expected, because the studies used different methods and data. Of 
course, the precision of implicit value of life estimates depends on how accurately job fatality 
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risk is measured. It is well known that random measurement error generally results in estimates 
of coefficients that are biased toward zero or attenuated (See Griliches (1986) for an excellent 
review of the early literature and Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001) for a review of the 
more recent literature). Here we document that measures of job risk commonly used in the 
estimation of hedonic labor market equilibrium models seem to measure poorly the job risk that 
workers face and examine the statistical issues involved when dealing with the non-random 
measurement errors in fatality risks for United States jobs. 
 In particular, we match the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey 
(ORG-CPS) to multiple measures of job risk: the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates from their 
Survey of Working Conditions and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
estimates from their National Traumatic Occupational Fatality survey. Because we have multiple 
measures of job risk, as well as aggregate measures of job risk by demographic groups, we may 
compare the various measures of job risk to infer the reliability of our job risk measures. The 
results are not heartening. We find strong evidence that the job risk measures contain noteworthy 
measurement error. Despite the fact that each of our measures of job risk purport to measure the 
same thing—the risk of a fatality while on the job—the various measures of job risk are not 
highly correlated, with the maximum correlation being 0.53.1 Regression coefficient estimates 
that do not account for substantial measurement error may be highly attenuated, which Hausman, 
Newey, Ichimura, and Powell (1991) term the iron law of econometrics. Attenuation bias 
suggests that existing estimates of the value of a statistical life are severely underestimated. 
 However, the situation concerning estimated compensated wage differentials is more 
complex. We find evidence that the measurement error in job risk measures is non-classical. That 
is, we find that the measurement error is correlated with the covariates that are usually in 
earnings or wage equations. When the measurement error in fatality risk is correlated with other 
variables in the wage equation, there may be other biases offsetting the attenuation that usually 
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occurs with purely random measurement error. We conclude by suggesting some attributes of the 
optimal estimator of compensating wage differentials in light of the complex measurement errors 
in fatal job risk that we document. 
Measuring the Price of Risk 
 The starting point for our analysis is a wage equation of the form: 
 *i i i iln( w ) X rβ γ ε= + +                (1) 
where iln( w ) is the natural logarithm of the i
th worker’s wage, *ir  is the measure of risk (possibly 
a vector), iX  is a vector of covariates, ( , )β γ are coefficients to be estimated, and iε is the error 
term of the regression. As a point of departure we consider the convenient case that occupies the 
bulk of the interest in the measurement error literature where 0i iCov( X , )ε =  and 
0*i iCov( r , )ε = , so that the risk measures and other covariates are exogenous. The wage 
Equation (1) with exogenous regressors is what Viscusi (1993) calls the basic approach in the 
literature and yields a natural interpretation for γ as the implicit price of risk. Accurate estimates 
of the implicit price of risk and other non-wage job characteristics have taken on increased 
importance because they are a focal part of attempts to uncover the underlying utility and cost 
functions (Kniesner and Leeth 1995), which is a subject of renewed interest by econometricians 
(Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2002). 
Data on Fatality Rates 
 Our data on wages and worker characteristics are from Outgoing Rotation Groups of the 
Current Population Survey (ORG-CPS). We match the ORG-CPS to measures of job risk. There 
are two major sources of government-reported job risk: (1) the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
estimates from their Survey of Working Conditions and (2) the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) estimates from their National Traumatic Occupational 
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Fatality Survey. The NIOSH data provide one-digit occupation or industry mortality rates by 
state, while the BLS data contain counts of deaths by three-digit occupation or industry codes but 
do not provide any regional variation. The risk measures have their own distinct costs and 
benefits for researchers. 
 The BLS data, available annually from 1995 to 2000, contain very detailed measures of 
the annual number of deaths, but the data suppression procedure requires at least five deaths in a 
cell before the number of deaths is reported. Thus, there are a substantial number of missing 
values in the BLS data. The use of annual data may be subject to a great deal of sampling error 
associated with the annual fluctuation in the number of deaths. Moreover, the BLS data only 
provide the counts of the number of deaths in each industry or occupation. To create a fatality 
rate, it is necessary for researchers to estimate the number of workers in an industry or 
occupation. To estimate the numbers of workers in industries and occupations, we use the ORG-
CPS data, which in turn generates additional measurement errors in our risk (fatality rate) 
measures. Finally, by their construction the BLS data mask geographic variation in job risk. 
 The NIOSH data provide fatality rates by one-digit industry or occupation codes by state. 
It reports five-year averages: 1981 to 1985, 1986 to 1990, and 1991 to 1995. NIOSH data, then, 
do not require the researcher to estimate the number of workers in an industry or occupation cell, 
allow job risks measure to vary by state, and smooth much of the sampling variation by using a 
five-year average. The use of the five-year average and the coarser one-digit industry or 
occupation codes by state reduces, but does not eliminate, the problem of missing values because 
of data suppression. On the other hand, the NIOSH data treat police officers and dental assistants 
as having the same job risk as both are in the same one-digit (service worker) occupation. The 
use of five-year averages, while smoothing the sampling variation, may miss important time-
series variation although having less so-called assignment error as respondents miscode their 
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one-digit industry and occupation more accurately than their three-digit industry and occupation 
(Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001: 3802–3805). 
 Although we ultimately use both industry-based and occupation-based risk measures, we 
would be remiss if we did not comment on the relative merits of the two risk measures. At first 
glance, the use of the industry measure seems inappropriate. Specifically, the industry risk 
measure assigns the same job risk to a secretary in the coal mining industry as to the coal miner, 
clearly overstating the secretary’s level of job risk and understating the coal miner’s job risk. In 
contrast, the use of occupational risk would combine the job risk of a secretary in the coal mining 
industry with a secretary in the insurance industry, presumably a pair with a much more 
homogeneous job risk. However, a worker’s industry is measured more accurately than a 
worker’s occupation (Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz 2001). The employer and employee agree 
on industry classification 84 to 92 percent of the time but agree on occupation classification only 
58 to 81 percent of the time with greater agreement the broader the classification (Mellow and 
Sider 1983). As an indication of the importance of assignment error to the problem at hand, for 
data in which both the firm and worker agree on the three-digit industry code, the estimated price 
of injury risk is 50 percent higher than in the typical data set with assignment error (Mellow and 
Sider 1983). 
 The quality of estimates is necessarily limited by the quality of measurement. No matter 
how sophisticated the theoretical and econometric models, data of poor quality may still provide 
estimates of poor quality. In the next section, we suggest why the data from the BLS and 
NIOSH, while providing extremely accurate measures of the aggregate job risk in the United 
States, may not provide accurate estimates of the job risk of workers in a representative sample. 
Summary of Measurement Error Problems 
There are essentially three problems in measuring of job fatality risk. First, because we 
divide workers into industries or occupations—some of which are quite small—we may have 
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considerable sampling variation within industry and occupation cells. Although both the BLS 
and NIOSH data recognize the problem of industry or occupation cells with few fatalities and 
suppress data when the number of fatalities is too low, the inherent sampling variation still 
creates measurement error. Second, within occupations, there may be a great deal of 
heterogeneity in the actual job risk, and the assignment of job risk may be extremely non-
random. For instance, employers may assign male and older clerks at convenience stores evening 
and late night hours when the risk of holdup—and injury during the robbery—are particularly 
high and assign female and younger clerks daytime hours. Because we only measure the 
aggregate job risk of convenience stores clerks, we in turn overestimate the job risk of young and 
female clerks and underestimate the job risk of older and male clerks. Finally, because we need 
to assign workers to an industry or occupation, the quality of our measurement is limited to the 
quality of the data on industry and occupation assignment, and we have noted that industry and 
occupation (especially at the three-digit level) are not measured accurately. 
Econometric Background 
 If the researcher could measure *i i( X ,r )  perfectly, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation of Equation (1) would provide consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters 
( , )β γ  if the functional form of the conditional mean function were properly specified and the 
covariates *i i( X ,r )  orthogonal to the error term. There are numerous reasons to suggest that the 
measure of job risk ( *ir ) is mismeasured and perhaps mismeasured badly. 
 First, government fatality reports are inherently an estimate of job risk: they are 
realizations of a random variable. For instance, suppose there are kN  workers in the kth industry 
(or occupation) category, and each worker is subjected to a risk, *kr . Unfortunately for the 
researcher, the government’s tally of deaths in the kth category is not exactly equal to the 
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expected number of deaths, *k kr N . The government’s tally is equal to the random variable kD . 
Using the random variable kD , the researcher constructs an estimate of 
*
kr  as k k kr D / N= . 
Although *k kE( r ) r= , it is almost certain that *k kr r≠  so that *k k kr r η= + , where kη  is the 
measurement error associated with the variable kr . 
 Even when workers correctly identify their industry and occupation (and as we will 
emphasize, there is much measurement error in the industry and occupation measures in the 
CPS), it is likely that the measurement of job risk is in error. Past studies have indicated that job 
risk differs by firm size, region, and worker characteristics. Thus, when we make the further 
substitution for the ith worker’s risk (who is in the kth industry/occupation class) that *i kr r= , we 
are undoubtedly introducing measurement error, or  
 *k i ikr r ν= +                  (2) 
where ikν represents the measurement error associated with using kr  as a proxy for *ir . The basic 
form of measurement error in Equation (2) undoubtedly attenuates the estimates of the 
coefficient of interest in the hedonic wage Equation (1), γ . From an empirical standpoint, the 
relevant issue is the severity of attenuation bias that results from the measurement error ikν .  
Determining the Extent of Measurement Error 
 We have up to four reports on the level of job risk that we may use to determine the 
extent of the measurement error. To see how multiple measures can be helpful, consider two 
measures of job risk: 
 *1 1i i ir r ν= +  and                 (3) 
 2 2
*
i i ir r ν= + ,                 (4) 
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where *ir is the true measure job risk, jiν  is the measurement error associated with the jth  
measure of job risk, and jir is the jth  observed measure of job risk. The covariance of the two 
measures is simply 
 * * *1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i i i i i i i iCov r r Var r Cov r Cov r Covν ν ν ν= + + + ,          (5) 
and the variances of the two measures are 
 * *1 1 1( ) ( ) 2 ( , ) ( )i i i i iVar r Var r Cov r Varν ν= + +  and            (6) 
 * *2 2 2( ) ( ) 2 ( , ) ( )i i i i iVar r Var r Cov r Varν ν= + + ,             (7) 
which provides us with six unknown parameters and three equations and demonstrates why it is 
impossible to make much progress on the problem in the form described in Equations (3) 
through (7): the system is underidentified.  
 Suppose we follow Griliches (1986) and assume for the time being that our measurement 
error is classical. If * *1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0i i i i i iCov r Cov r Covν ν ν ν= = =  our three-equation system 
reduces to 
 *1 2( , ) ( )i i iCov r r Var r= ,                (8) 
 *1 1( ) ( ) ( )i i iVar r Var r Var ν= + , and              (9)  
 *2 2( ) ( ) ( )i i iVar r Var r Var ν= + .             (10) 
With additional covariates, one needs to make the additional assumptions that 1( , ) 0i iCov Xν =  
and 2( , ) 0i iCov Xν =  so that the measurement errors are uncorrelated with covariates in our basic 
example case. Because we have up to four measures of job risk, the classic errors-in-variables 
model has empirical content: the covariance of any two measures of risk should have precisely 
the same covariance as any other two measures. When the measurement error is classical and 
there are multiple measures of a variable, one may use Instrumental Variables (IV) to obtain a 
consistent estimate of the price of risk (Griliches 1986).2  
  9
It is useful now to present a convenient decomposition for OLS regressions. Yule (1907)  
has shown that the estimation of the hedonic wage Equation (1) with OLS is equivalent to the 
results using three simpler regressions. First, one estimates 
 ln( )i i iw X b ε ′= +               (11) 
and recovers the residuals, which we denote ln( )iw ′ . Second, one estimates 
 i i ir X uδ ′= +                (12) 
and recovers the residuals, which we denote ir′ . Finally, one then estimates the equation   
 ln( )i i iw r γ ε′ ′ ′′= + .              (13) 
Because both the dependent variable and independent variables have been purged of their 
covariation with X, estimation of Equation (13) will yield precisely the same estimate of γ  as the 
OLS of γ  from the multiple regression Equation (1) (Goldberger 1991, Chapter 17). 
 Exploiting Yule’s decomposition and continuing with the convenient case where the 
measurement error is classical, our three equations system of covariances would simply become 
 *1 2( , | ) ( | )i i i i iCov r r X Var r X= ,            (14) 
 * *1 1 1( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( )i i i i i iVar r X Var r X Var X Var r X Varν ν= + = + , and       (15) 
 * *2 2 2( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( )i i i i i i i i iVar r X Var r X Var X Var r X Varν ν= + = + ,        (16) 
where 1 1( | ) ( )i iVar X Varν ν= and 2 2( | ) ( )i i iVar X Varν ν=  by the assumptions that 1( , ) 0i iCov Xν =  
and 2( , ) 0i iCov Xν = . As * *( ) ( | )i iVar r Var r X≥ , the addition of covariates must always reduce the 
signal-to-noise ratio [ ( )* *( | ) / ( | ) ( )i i jiVar r X Var r X Var v+ ]. In general, the addition of covariates 
should increase the attenuation bias associated with the measurement error. 
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Empirical Results 
 In Table 1 we present the correlation and Yulized residual correlations for the various job 
risk measures. We use data from the 1995 ORG-CPS. The raw correlation before conditioning on 
any covariates ranges from 0.53 to 0.30. Because the correlation differs by a magnitude of over 
75 percent, we have at least some evidence that the measurement error is non-classical. When we 
condition on the full set of covariates the correlations range from 0.41 to 0.02. Including both 
state controls and industry and occupation controls reduces the correlation among the various 
measures. In absence of measurement error the correlations should be 1.0. A quick review of 
Equations (8) through (10) and (14) through (16) reveals another testable implication of the 
classic errors-in-variable model: the correlation among all four risk measures should be identical. 
We clearly reject the hypothesis of no measurement error and reject the hypothesis that the 
measurement error is classical. 
 Attenuation 
 In Table 2, we produce the full range of Yulized residual covariances, which in turn may 
be used to construct any coefficient estimate desired. The OLS estimates of the price of risk are 
simply the ratio of the risk measure covariance with the wage measure, divided by the variance 
of the risk measure; one may form any IV estimate desired by dividing the covariance of risk and 
wage measures by the covariance of two risk measures. The ratio of the variance of the risk 
measure to its covariance with another risk measure in turn meters the magnitude of the 
attenuation bias resulting from measurement error in job risk. The ratios of the variance-to-
covariance are large, particularly for the BLS occupation measure, which suggests that OLS 
estimates of the hedonic wage Equation (1) would be substantially attenuated.  
Negative measures of job risk compensation are substantially attenuated as well. Notice 
that the covariances of the logarithm of wages and the various job risk measures are quite 
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different and often of the opposite sign, which reinforces the emerging implication that 
measurement error is non-classical. The negative covariances between wages and job risks 
suggest that our measures of job risk may be correlated with the regression error.3 Indeed, 
because job risk is a normal good (Viscusi and Aldy 2002), economic theory suggests that 
factors increasing the wages and, hence, the wealth of the workers should reduce job risk. There 
would appear to be a clear theoretical reason suggesting that unobservables that increase wages 
should be negatively correlated with job risk. 
A Deeper Look at Risk Measures 
 It may be informative to invert our research focus and consider not whether there is a 
wide variation of estimates for the price of risk but, instead, whether there is a discernable 
pattern to the price of risk coefficients such that certain ones are similar to the estimates 
highlighted in Viscusi and Aldy (2002). In particular, does one of the risk measures or covariate 
lists stand out in terms of producing estimated price of risk and implicit value of life estimates 
that are similar to results that lie in or around the range of $4 million to $9.5 million? 
 In Tables 3 and 4 we present regression results for OLS estimates of the price of risk and 
value of life for the four basic risk measures: BLS industry and occupation and NIOSH industry 
and occupation. To avoid the problems of aggregation mentioned earlier, we estimate separate 
regressions for white men and white women. The main result to emerge from Tables 3 and 4 is 
that the regressions estimated with NIOSH industry risk measures, particularly for white men, 
are most like the results highlighted in Viscusi and Aldy (2002) as being the preferred estimates 
for applications of economic policy. Our result that the NIOSH industry based risk measure 
produces price of risk measures that are most in line with economic theory and past evidence is 
consistent with Moore and Viscusi (1988), who first identified the relative merits of the NIOSH 
risk measure in hedonic wage equation research.  
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Discussion 
 Existing estimates of the price of risk have generally ignored any measurement problem 
in the measures of job risk. We assemble compelling evidence of non-ignorable measurement 
error in the various measures of job-related fatal injury risk. Because we have multiple measures 
of job risk, we may look at the correlation among the various measures of job risk. The 
correlation is seldom above 0.5, and the inclusion of richer sets of covariates lowers the 
correlations among pairs of risk measures. 
 The form of the measurement error is also econometrically troublesome. We find 
measurement error in the fatality rate (ν) that is correlated with the covariates (X) typically 
included in wage or earnings equations. The correlation between ν and X means that typical 
errors-in-variables models will not reveal unbiased parameter estimates of the price of risk. 
Given that we find convincing evidence that the measurement error is correlated with observable 
factors that affect wages (the covariates), we expect that the measurement error will also be 
correlated with unobservable factors affecting wages (the regression error). Complex correlations 
among the fatality risk regressor, other regression covariates, and the overall regression error in 
the hedonic wage Equation (1) make obtaining consistent estimates of the price of risk in a 
hedonic wage equation econometrically challenging. 
 Our IV estimates illustrate the potential attenuation that may plague the OLS estimates. 
Coefficient estimates may also be biased away from zero if there is a negative covariance 
between the measurement error and the true value of job risk (Black, Berger, and Scott 2000; 
Kane, Rouse, and Staiger 1999). Not accounting for heterogeneity in workers’ skills in avoiding 
work-related accidents may cause us to overestimate the price of risk (Shogren and Stamland 
2002). Although the presence of measurement error that we have documented suggests that 
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current estimates of the price of risk are severely attenuated, other biases may cause us to 
overestimate the price of risk (For an interesting recent empirical study see Lalive forthcoming). 
 The problems are formidable in obtaining statistically consistent point estimates for γ in 
Equation (1). The existing measurement error literature provides little guidance in how to correct 
for non-classical measurement error problems of the type we have found. Because job accidents 
are random variables with a very low incidence, the coefficient of variation is quite volatile and 
some inter-temporal smoothing techniques might be applied fruitfully to the time-series of risks 
for the large majority of workers with jobs in the low range of r (McClellan and Staiger 1999). 
Job risk undoubtedly varies by the characteristics of the workers and firms in ways in which 
economists do not yet fully understand but may be handled with specialized IV techniques that 
explicitly consider the stochastic characteristics of multiple samples (Dickens and Ross 1984). 
 We conclude by reiterating that existing estimates of the price of fatal injury risk may 
suffer from substantial attenuation bias to the extent that they have not controlled for 
measurement error in job risk. However, because of the evidence of non-classical measurement 
errors in risk that seems widespread, we believe that the conventional IV point estimates in 
Section 4 are most likely not statistically consistent estimates of γˆ  in Equation (1). If crucial for 
policy, point estimates should ideally use the NIOSH based industry risk measure with 
estimators that take account of the particular type of measurement errors labor economists 
confront in micro data sets on workers. In many policy applications, though, bounding the 
estimate of the price of risk will be sufficient for informed decision making (Kniesner and 
Viscusi 2003) so that researchers can make increased use of recent developments in the 
econometrics of error bounds on parameters (Black, Berger, and Scott 2000; Bound, Brown, and 
Mathiowetz 2001). 
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Endnotes 
 
1. The correlation we find across risk measures is at the middle of the correlations for 
multiple measures of labor market variables such as transfer payments and education 
reported in Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001). 
 
2. When the measurement error is non-classical IV estimates may produce inconsistent 
estimates (Black, Berger, and Scott 2001; Frazis and Loewenstein 2002; Kane, Rouse, 
and Staiger 1999). 
 
3. Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2002) argue that the measurement error in schooling in the 
1990 Census is negatively correlated with the regression error, suggesting that less able 
people are more likely to make reporting mistakes and more likely to receive lower 
wages. 
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Table 1: Correlations and OLS Residual Correlations for 
Male Workers1995 CPS Outgoing Rotations Data, BLS Risk Data, and NIOSH Risk Data 
 
Basic Controls no yes yes yes yes 
Marital Status no no yes yes yes 
State no no no yes yes 
Industry/Occupation no no no no yes 
      
Correlations      
NIOSH Ind / NIOSH Occ 0.53 0.43 0.43 0.32 0.28 
NIOSH Ind / BLS Ind 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.06 
NIOSH Ind / BLS Occ 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.05 
NIOSH Occ / BLS Ind 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.07 
NIOSH Occ / BLS Occ 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.09 
BLS Ind / BLS Occ 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.22 
Note: The residual correlations are based on the OLS regression of the risk variable on a set of independent 
variables. The basic controls are dummy variables for age, age quartic, education, race, ethnicity, and union 
coverage. After estimating the residuals for each regression, we estimated the residual correlations for each 
set of regressions. The number of observations for the 1995 CPS Outgoing Rotations data is 51,140. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2: Covariances and Variances of Residual Estimates for Male Workers 
1995 CPS Outgoing Rotation Data, NIOSH Risk Data, and BLS Risk Data 
 
Panel 1. NIOSH Industry / NIOSH Occupation 
 Basic 
Controls Marital Status State Ind/Occ 
VAR (Lnwage) 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 
VAR (NIOSH Ind) 40.02 39.92 33.91 14.80 
VAR (NIOSH Occ) 45.75 45.71 38.57 17.09 
COV (NIOSH Ind, NIOSH Occ) 18.50 18.43 11.56 4.51 
COV (Lnwage, NIOSH Ind) 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.01 
COV (Lnwage, NIOSH Occ) −0.22 −0.23 −0.13 0.02 
R2 Lnwage on X 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.37 
R2 NIOSH Ind on X 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.64 
R2 NIOSH Occ on X 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.66 
Panel 2. NIOSH Industry / BLS Industry 
 Basic 
Controls Marital Status State Ind/Occ 
VAR (Lnwage) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.21 
VAR (NIOSH Ind) 47.80 47.67 39.58 18.20 
VAR (BLS Ind) 59.46 59.36 58.09 35.65 
COV (NIOSH Ind, BLS Ind) 24.56 24.45 21.72 1.53 
COV (Lnwage, NIOSH Ind) 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.02 
COV (Lnwage, BLS Ind) −0.06 −0.08 −0.04 −0.06 
R2 Lnwage on X 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.36 
R2 NIOSH Ind on X 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.63 
R2 BLS Ind on X 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.43 
Panel 3. NIOSH Industry / BLS Occupation 
 Basic 
Controls Marital Status State Ind/Occ 
VAR (Lnwage) 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.21 
VAR (NIOSH Ind) 39.69 39.59 32.60 13.75 
VAR (BLS Occ) 154.54 154.35 152.86 115.10 
COV (NIOSH Ind, BLS Occ) 21.66 21.58 18.90 2.02 
COV (Lnwage, NIOSH Ind) 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.01 
COV (Lnwage, BLS Occ) −0.22 −0.23 −0.18 0.06 
R2 Lnwage on X 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.41 
R2 NIOSH Ind on X 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.66 
R2 BLS Occ on X 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.29 
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Table 2 (cont.): Covariances and Variances of Residual Estimates for Male Workers 
1995 CPS Outgoing Rotation Data, NIOSH Risk Data, and BLS Risk Data 
 
Panel 4. NIOSH Occupation / BLS Industry 
 Basic 
Controls Marital Status State Ind/Occ 
VAR (Lnwage) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.21 
VAR (NIOSH Occ) 50.20 50.14 42.08 19.02 
VAR (BLS Ind) 59.16 59.06 57.83 35.39 
COV (NIOSH Occ, BLS Ind) 18.39 18.31 15.62 1.99 
COV (Lnwage, NIOSH Occ) −0.22 −0.23 −0.14 0.02 
COV (Lnwage, BLS Ind) −0.06 −0.07 −0.03 −0.06 
R2 Lnwage on X 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.36 
R2 NIOSH Occ on X 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.65 
R2 BLS Ind on X 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.43 
Panel 5. NIOSH Occupation / BLS Occupation 
 Basic 
Controls Marital Status State Ind/Occ 
VAR (Lnwage) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.21 
VAR (NIOSH Occ) 59.99 59.95 51.18 23.63 
VAR (BLS Occ) 175.79 175.53 173.78 131.13 
COV (NIOSH Occ, BLS Occ) 39.80 39.72 36.50 5.11 
COV (Lnwage, NIOSH Occ) −0.22 −0.23 −0.14 0.02 
COV (Lnwage, BLS Occ) −0.20 −0.21 0.16 0.05 
R2 Lnwage on X 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.36 
R2 NIOSH Occ on X 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.65 
R2 BLS Occ on X 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.29 
Panel 6. BLS Industry / BLS Occupation  
 Basic 
Controls Marital Status State Ind/Occ 
VAR (Lnwage) 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.21 
VAR (BLS Ind) 67.88 67.78 66.45 42.19 
VAR (BLS Occ) 175.28 175.02 173.33 130.92 
COV (BLS Ind, BLS Occ) 44.03 43.91 42.56 16.43 
COV (Lnwage, BLS Ind) −0.06 −0.08 −0.04 −0.06 
COV (Lnwage, BLS Occ) −0.20 −0.21 −0.16 0.05 
R2 Lnwage on X 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.36 
R2 BLS Ind on X 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.43 
R2 BLS Occ on X 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.28 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3. Estimated Price of Risk for White Male Workers 
 
Panel 1.  ORG and NIOSH Industry Risk: 1995*     
      
Basic Controls yes yes yes yes  
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
      
Risk/100,000 157 118 379 120  
 (4.32) (3.28) (7.68) (1.86)  
Life Value (1,000,000) 5.5 4.1 13.3 4.2  
*There are 41,046 observations in the regressions.     
Panel 2.  ORG and NIOSH Occupation Risk:1995*      
     
Basic Controls yes yes yes yes  
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
      
Risk/100,000 -493 -515 -438 171  
 (-13.89) (-14.62) (-8.13) (2.12)  
Life Value (1,000,000) ---- ---- ---- ----  
*There are 25,116 observations in the regressions.      
Panel 3. ORG and NIOSH Industry Risk: 1995*      
      
Basic Controls   yes     yes     yes               yes 
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
Risk/100,000 -108 -135 -53.3 -175  
 (-3.45) (-4.32) (-1.34) (-3.73)  
Life Value (1,000,000) ---- ---- ---- ----  
*There are 43,080 observations in the regressions.      
Panel 4. ORG and BLS Occupation Risk: 1995*      
      
Basic Controls  yes    yes    yes               yes 
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
Risk/100,000 -143 -147 -122 37.6  
 (-6.86) (-7.13) (-4.84) (1.39)  
Life Value (1,000,000) ---- ---- ---- 1.3  
*There are 25,116 observations in the regressions.      
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Table 4. Estimated Price of Risk for White Female Workers 
 
Panel 1.  ORG and NIOSH Industry Risk: 1995*     
      
Basic Controls yes yes yes yes  
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
      
Risk/100,000 112 110 268 -60.7  
 (2.35) (2.32) (4.54) (-0.87)  
Life Value (1,000,000) 3.9 3.9 9.4 ----  
*There are 42,030 observations in the regressions.      
Panel 2.   ORG and NIOSH Occupation Risk:1995*     
      
Basic Controls yes yes yes yes  
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
      
Risk/100,000 -434 -437 -92 127  
 (-6.73)    (-6.79)    (-1.12) (1.26)  
Life Value (1,000,000) ---- ---- ---- 4.4  
*There are 25,459 observations in the regressions.      
Panel 3. ORG and BLS Industry Risk: 1995*     
      
Basic Controls yes yes yes yes  
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
Risk/100,000 -117 -121 -31.5 -339  
 (-2.10)    (-2.16)    (-0.44) (-3.74)  
Life Value (1,000,000) ---- ----   ---- ----  
*There are 44,410 observations in the regressions.      
Panel 4. ORG and BLS Occupation Risk: 1995*     
      
Basic Controls yes yes yes yes  
Marital Status no yes yes yes  
State no no yes yes  
Industry/Occupation no no no yes  
      
Risk/100,000 -203 -202 -192 123  
 (-2.92) (-2.91) (-2.18) (1.27)  
Life Value (1,000,000) ---- ---- ---- 4.3  
*There are 33,501 observations in the regressions.      
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